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INTERNATIONALIZATION OF BOARD MEMBERS AND COMPLIANCE WITH 
MANDATORY DISCLOSURE: EMPIRICAL STUDY OF IFRS 3 (BUSINESS 
COMBINATIONS) IN BRAZIL 
 
 
The determinants tested in the mandatory disclosure are usually about business and 
cultural factors. However, the board members have a strong power of decision on the 
information disclosed, so it is natural that the characteristics of board members can 
influence the fulfillment of disclosure. This study analyses the level of compliance with 
IFRS 3 and examines whether it is influenced by the level of internationalization of board 
members. Our results indicate a moderate level of compliance, which is greater the 
greater the weight of foreign board members and the weight of board members with 







The fulfilment of disclosure requirements is of the utmost importance to users of the 
information, when making economic decisions. Previous studies have shown that disclosure 
affects investors' decisions (Bhasin and Shaikh, 2011). 
Studies have demonstrated the potential impact of accounting disclosure and therefore 
regulators need to ensure that financial information is accurate and transparent not only by 
increasing mandatory disclosure but also through enforcement mechanisms.  
While research on mandatory disclosure has accompanied its increase in recent years 
as the need for information has grown, these studies are still outnumbered by those on 
voluntary disclosure. 
Some studies have shown that the quality of information improved following the adoption 
of international standards - IFRS - International Financial Reporting Standards (Leuz and 
Verrecchia, 2000; Daske and Gebhardt, 2006), thus affecting the decisions of users of the 
information. 
But do companies actually comply with the IFRS disclosure requirements? In fact, even 
though IFRS call for an increasing amount of information in line with the needs identified by 
users, the decisions of these users will be influenced if companies fail to comply, provide 
incorrect information, or even omit information. Chen and Zhang (2010) found that the 
application of IFRS do not necessarily mean full compliance with IFRS; for example, in 
China it was only after the application of enforcement mechanisms, including audit 
committees, that international standards were met. From this decade and because of the 
increasing importance of IAS, it’s began to emerge many studies that sought to answer the 
following question: why do non-compliance exist? 
Given the wide range of disclosure required by IFRS, our study focuses on a single 
standard - IFRS 3 - Business Combinations. This standard sets out the principles to be used 
by the acquiring company engaged in a business combination, namely: how to recognize 
and measure the assets acquired and liabilities assumed in a business combination, how 
to recognize and measure the non-controlling interests and goodwill, and what kind of 
information must be disclosed in the new entity financial statements. 
Business combinations reflect business investment aimed at increasing 
competitiveness, reduce risk and enhancing competition and synergies between business 
supports. Business combinations may also significantly affect companies' financial 
statements, including assets and liabilities. Hamberg, Paananen and Novak (2010) used 
Swedish data to demonstrate the accounting consequences of the adoption of IFRS 3 in 
the equity market and found that after its adoption in January 2005 the value of capitalized 
goodwill increased substantially. Similarly, the impairment of goodwill is considerably lower 
than its amortization and impairment in accordance with Swedish standards. Thus, the 
adoption of IFRS 3 led to an increase in profit. The authors also reported that, rightly or 
wrongly, investors see the gains arising from IFRS 3 as a consequence of higher future 
cash flows. 
However, in spite of the potential significant effect of business combinations in the 
financial statements, not all the firms fully comply with IFRS 3 disclosure requirements 
(Glaum, Schmidt, and Street, 2013; Lucas and Lourenço, 2014). These studies analyse 
determinants of compliance, as company and cultural factors. But none of these studies 
relate the level of compliance with and the features of the company’s board members, 
namely internationalization of board members. Note that, board members have a strong 
power of decision on the information disclosed, so it is natural that the characteristics of 
board members can influence the fulfillment of disclosure. 
We aim to fil this gap in the accounting literature by analysing the level of compliance 
with IFRS 3 disclosure requirements and whether it is influenced by the level of 
internationalization of board members. The empirical study relies on an emerging country, 
Brazil, where the board members’ internationalization is an essential feature in the labour 
market.  
According to Peltonen, Sousa and Vansteenkiste (2012), financial characteristics are the 
second factor determining investment in emerging countries. This raised awareness of the 
need to understand the factors that affect compliance with the disclosure required in this 
type of market, so that the increasing transparency of information allows investors' 
information needs to be met. 
Brazil adopted IFRS in 2010 and it is a relevant country because it is a growing capital 
market; in 2011, the Brazilian Stock Exchange (M&FBovespa) was the world’s eighth 
largest. But Brazil is also a country which laws on investor protection are weak and where 
there is a high concentration of ownership (Lourenço and Branco, 2013). The specific 
features of this country, such as the risk associated with economic policies and their legal 
systems strongly, significantly influence disclosure. Paul N. Michas (2011) analyzed the 
importance of the auditing profession in emerging markets and showed that audit quality is 
higher in companies located in countries with a more developed auditing profession. 
The disclosure of information and integrity of reports have also been affected by the 
governance structure through audit committees, family members in the government, among 
other factors (Anderson, Mansi and Reeb, 2004). If governance has an impact on the 
dissemination of information, it probably also has impact on compliance with mandatory 
disclosure. It is therefore necessary to understand which features of governance not 
previously studied may affect compliance. We analyse foreign board members and board 
members with training abroad. 
Our results indicate a moderate level of compliance with IFRS 3 disclosure requirements, 
which is greater the greater the weight of younger board managers with post-graduate 
education, specially obtained abroad 
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we review the literature on determinants 
of disclosure, as well as on IFRS 3. Section 3 presents the hypotheses development. 
Section 4 presents the methodology and Section 5 shows the results. Finally, section 6 
presents the concluding remarks. 
 
2. Literature review 
 
2.1 Mandatory Disclosure  
 
Although there are already many studies on the disclosure of accounting information, 
they are still predominantly on voluntary disclosure. Voluntary disclosure is “any disclosure 
by companies not mandated by law and/or self-regulatory bodies” (Owusu-Ansah, 1998, p. 
154). Examples of studies about voluntary information include those of Hussainey and 
Walker (2009) on the effect of dividends on voluntary disclosure and the relationship 
between current earnings and future earnings and Patelli and Prencipe (2007) on the 
relationship between voluntary disclosure and independent directors in the presence of a 
dominant shareholder. 
Studies on mandatory disclosure are scarcer and they predominantly analyse the 
determinants of the level of compliance with disclosure requirements. “Mandatory 
disclosure is the minimum information wich promulgated regulation requires from a 
reporting entity” (Abdullah, M., Evans, L., Fraser, I. Tsalavoutas, I., 2015, p.330). However, 
studies on mandatory disclosure have been growing considerably in recent years because 
of the increase in mandatory legislation in accounting through IAS’s – International 
Accounting Standards and IFRS’s - International Financial Reporting Standards. 
However, while some studies address determinants that may influence the fulfilment of 
disclosure, other equally important studies seek empirical evidence of the impact of the 
disclosure level. For example, Diamond and Robert (1991) demonstrated that information 
disclosure reduces information asymmetry and the cost of capital, attracts investors and 
increases liquidity. Hodgdon, Tondkar, Harless and Adhikari (2008) found that compliance 
with the mandatory disclosure of IFRS decreases information asymmetry and improves the 
ability of financial analysts to provide more precise forecast.  
As this work will be on mandatory disclosure and their determinants, then we will mention 
studies on this topic chronologically. The studies that we will mention imply the creation of 
an index to verify compliance with disclosure (independent variable), as well as a panoply 
of determinants (dependent variables) that have been tested over time. 
Cooke (1989) studied the disclosure of Swedish companies. Two of the objectives of his 
paper was to understand the significant relationship between quotation status and 
disclosure and determine if quotation status, assets size, annual sales, number of 
shareholders and parent company relationship affect disclosure. To realize this work, the 
author creates an index with 224 items (financial statements – 119, measurements and 
valuation methods – 39, ratios, statistics and segmental information – 16, projections and 
budgetary disclosure – 9, financial story – 9, social responsibility accounting – 32). The 
results of the study demonstrated a significant relation between the extent of disclosure and 
listing status and also to size.  
Patton and Zelenka (1997) realized an empirical analysis in Czech Republic about the 
determinants of the extent of disclosure. The sample of this study is composed by 50 joint-
stock companies that were included in the 1993 Prague Stock Exchange. The dependents 
variables are based on Czech regulations (three indexes). At that time, the literature about 
mandatory disclosure was scarce, so the authors were seeking independent variables in 
studies about voluntary disclosure and the selected dependent variables were the firm size, 
profitability performance, financial risk (leverage and percentage intangible assets) and 
monitoring variables (listing status, big six international audit firm, number of employees 
and industry). The variables that showed statistically significant were: type of auditor, 
number of employees. 
From 2000, it began to emerge studies on compliance with IAS, because these 
standards began at this time to gain much importance at the international level by means 
of accounting harmonization. 
Street and Bryant in 2000 made a different study because analyse the compliance with 
IAS and in the same time analyse if companies with U.S. listings or filings present different 
results for compliance and for level of disclosure. The sample is composed by: 11 U.S. listed 
companies, 30 U.S. listing companies that claim to comply with IAS and finally 41 non U.S. 
filing or listing companies. In this study authors have to create an index of compliance with 
29 standards (IAS). The results appointed that the extent of compliance is greater for 
companies with U.S. listings or filings, because the mean of index is higher when companies 
have U.S. listings or filings (84% against 77%). So, the findings suggest that the 
enforcement is higher for companies with U.S. listings or filings.  
Chen, Charles J.P., Jaggi, Bikki (2000) examined the association between financial 
disclosures and independents on corporate boards on a sample of 87 large Hong Kong 
firms. The results of their study suggest that there is a positive association between the 
proportion of independents on corporate boards and financial disclosures. They also 
analyse the effect of family control and the results suggest that this association is weaker 
for family controlled firms compared to non-family controlled firms. 
Naser, Al-Khatib and Karbhari (2002) investigate whether the introduction of IAS in 
Jordan in 1990 influenced the depth of corporate information disclosure. This research was 
conducted in 132 companies for the years 1998/1999 and were analysed independent 
variables into four categories: market – company size, audit firm’s status, industry type; 
performance – profit margin, return on equity, liquidity; ownership – listed on the AFM 
(Amman Financial Market) with high spread and structure – companies listed on the AFM 
with a high gearing ratio. The dependent variable was an index of disclosure with 86 items 
and he results demonstrate that the disclosure improved with the introduction of IAS’s and 
the disclosure level is normally associated with size, audit firms status, liquidity, gearing and 
profitability. 
Archambault and Archambault in 2003 develop a model with cultural, national and 
corporate factors that can influence disclosure. This study stands out because it was carried 
out with a large number of countries (33 countries) and variables. For the study, the authors 
create an disclosure index with seven information categories: general information, income 
statement, balance sheet, funds-flows statement, accounting policies, stockholders 
information and supplementary information and extract the information from annual reports 
of 1993 and 1992. Note that, for each category exists different numbers of information’s.  In 
the model created by the authors the disclosure was a response of cultural (factors: power 
distance, individualism, uncertainly avoidance, masculinity, education and religion), national 
(factors: political – freedom, legal and press; economic – development, inflation and capital 
markets) and corporate systems (factors: financial – ownership, exchanges, dividends, 
auditors and leverage; operating: size, industries and foreign sales). The developed model 
provided a good explanation about the disclosure decision and also explain differences of 
disclosures between companies in same or different country. 
Al-Akra, Edie and Ali (2010) examines the influence of accounting disclosure regulation, 
governance reforms and ownership changes on mandatory disclosure of IFRS’s. This study 
was conducted in Jordan in the years 1996 and 2004 in 80 non-financial companies. To 
realize this study, the authors created two checklists based on IFRS’s in the years 2004 
and 1996 and found that disclosure compliance is significantly higher in 2004 (79%) than 
that in 1996 (55%). The regulation reforms was the most significant variable. Note also, 
governance reforms and the mandate of audit committees as a significant determinant of 
compliance.  
Alanezi and Albuloushi (2011) determined the impact of the presence of a voluntary audit 
committee on required disclosure practices of IFRS in Kuwait. Using 18 relevant IFRS in 
this context, an index based on 199 items was developed to investigate the level of 
disclosure in the annual reports of a sample of 68 listed companies in Kuwait in 2007. The 
level of compliance in this study is 72% (199 items checklist from some IFRS’s). The results 
revealed that the presence of an audit committee, several members of the same family on 
the board and leverage were the most important variables to explain companies' disclosure 
practices of IFRS. The results of this study also showed that compliance is lower in family-
dominated companies but is higher when exists an audit committee and when leverage is 
higher. Other variables (control variables) like company size, profitability, company age and 
ownership diffusion are not statistically significant. 
Mısırlıoğlu, Tucker and Yükseltürk (2011) study if the mandatory adoption of IFRS by 
Turkish listed companies in 2005 was successful and guarantee compliance. To carry out 
this study the authors did not create an index of compliance but made an improvement 
coefficient to understand if disclosures practises have improved. They find that although 
there are some improvements, the vast majority of the disclosure items required by IFRS 
were not disclosed. The firm characteristics like Auditor type, size, and the degree of foreign 
ownership of shares exert a positive impact on the disclosures. The authors also studied 
the role of firm and country level factors played in the adoption of IFRS and for this realize 
interviews. These analyse reveals that the dominance of tax laws, the lack of enforcement, 
corporate governance issues, and inadequate management information systems were all 
significant constraints to the successful adoption of IFRS. 
 
2.1.1 Mandatory Disclosure in IFRS 3 – Business Combinations 
 
As IFRS 3 – Business Combinations is the norm investigated in this study, then we will 
mention some studies on compliance with the disclosure of this standard alone or this 
standard in conjunction with other standards. 
Glaum et al. (2013) analysing the level of compliance with IFRS 3 and IAS 36 by 
European companies, the authors found a high level of compliance and that this can be 
influenced by both firm and country characteristics. At the firm level, they demonstrated that 
compliance is influenced by the importance of goodwill, experience with IFRS, the type of 
auditor, the presence of an audit committee, the issuance of securities in the study period, 
and the company's power structure. With respect to the country, compliance is influenced 
by the level of enforcement and the size of the capital market. Finally they found that the 
culture of the countries (conservatism) also has an impact on the level of compliance with 
disclosure requirements. 
Lucas and Lourenço (2014) examined how firm and country characteristics influence the 
level of compliance with IFRS. This study was conducted based on European listed 
companies and determined the level of compliance with IFRS 3 disclosure requirements. 
The results showed that compliance is influenced by both corporate and country features. 
The results of this study show that firms located in common-law countries have a strong 
level of compliance with IFRS 3 and those in the "French-civil-law" countries have poor 
compliance. The return on assets was also found to be a strong determinant of compliance. 
Abdullah et al. (2015) examine the effect of family control on IFRS mandatory disclosures 
for Malaysian companies in 2008. These authors demonstrate a negative association 
between a family control and compliance with IFRS’s. Another interesting thing that the 
authors found was a negative relationship between board expertise in accounting and 
compliance. The authors suggest that managers with expertise in accounting, can use this 
knowledge tendentiously and only reveal what interests them. This study also demonstrates 
an insignificant relation between disclosure level and firm value. We emphasize the fact that 
this study looked at the length of several standards, however, the level of compliance for 
IFRS 3 was 77%. 
In conclusion we notice that there is already some literature on compliance with the 
disclosure of IFRS and to precisely on IFRS 3. However, in cited literature were tested 
several variables (business, cultural, governance) that is believed to have an effect on 
compliance. But the fact is that has not tested whether certain board members features, 
including internationalization may have an effect on compliance 
 
3. Hypotheses development 
 
In fact, it has been demonstrated that disclosure has a strong impact on the users of 
information and therefore more studies are required on the determinants of compliance. 
However, there may be other determinants that have not yet been tested from this 
perspective e.g. characteristics of board members, and which may also prove relevant. The 
studies quoted below demonstrate the potential importance of the characteristics of the 
board members in other contexts. 
Anderson et al. (2004) believed that the characteristics of the directors influenced the 
integrity of financial reports. In a sample of S&P 500 firms, they find that the cost of debt is 
inversely related to board independence and board size. They also find that fully 
independent audit committees are associated with a significantly lower cost of debt 
financing. Similarly, yield spreads are negatively related to audit committee size and 
meeting frequency.  
Verriest, Gaeremynck and Thornton (2013) investigate the association between 
corporate governance strength and EU listed firms’ choices on IFRS adoption in 2005. They 
measure governance strength by aggregating variables such as board independence, 
board functioning and audit committee effectiveness. To analyse compliance, the authors 
selected 15 standards. The sample was made with 223 European firms located in 15 
different countries and results demonstrate heterogeneity in both compliance and disclosure 
quality. The authors also conclude that stronger governance firms comply better with IFRS 
and disclose more information (mandatory and voluntary)  
Despite having shown the importance of correct disclosure and its potential impact, we 
believe we can add empirical knowledge by demonstrating that certain characteristics of the 
board not yet studied from this perspective also have a strong influence on the level of 
compliance with mandatory disclosure requirements. Note that Verriest et al. (2013) 
examine some governance characteristics (board independence, board and audit 
committee effectiveness and operations); however, they focused on a different standard 
(IAS 39) and the context was Europe rather than the emerging country i.e. Brazil used 
herein. 
As Alanezi and Albuloushi (2011) said and we agreed board members frequently make 
decisions to benefit their own self-interest to the detriment of the shareholders. For that 
reason, a vigorous board is needed to represent shareholders’ interests and to control the 
management’ s actions, as well as a set of mechanisms to help in monitoring them.  
Brazil has very specific characteristics and compliance with standards is not high due to 
enforcement is low, so it is expected that the board members’ features are a differential 
factor in fulfilling the mandatory disclosure. We emphasize also that a strong enforcement 
alone does not guarantee compliance, however, this is not the case of Brazil, because in 
this country the enforcement is low. It is further noted that Brazil adopted IFRS in 2010 and 
according to Amiran (2012) the adoption of international standards enhances foreign direct 
investment.  
It has been shown that foreign investment improves governance and increase 
transparency (Dyck, 2001). Other studies also analyze the relationship between foreign 
ownership of firms and the degree of compliance, notably the study of Mısırlıoğlu et 
al.(2013).  
Based on theoretical considerations, this study explores hypotheses about board 
members features that could affect the level of compliance with disclosure requirements, 
namely the internationalization. 
 
H1: Foreign board members improve compliance with disclosure  
 




4.1. Sample and data 
 
The sample for this paper was collected for the years 2010, 2011, 2012 and 2013. We 
analyzed all Brazilian listed companies and therefore collected electronically the reports of 
607 Brazilian companies for the years 2010, 2011, 2012 and 2013. We subsequently 
checked every report to identify which companies had business combinations. This proved 
to be time-consuming as the IFRS do not define a priori the number of the note disclosing 
business combinations; it can be found in various numbers. Indeed, we found that some 
companies referred to this information throughout the report and not in a single Note. After 
this selection, we obtained a sample of 136 observations (companies with business 
combinations in 2010, 2011, 2012 and/or 2013).  
We then collected the “formulários de referência” of these companies to assemble 
information related to the characteristics of the board, finance or audit committee, and 
revenue obtained from abroad. Eleven companies were removed from the sample as they 
did not provide the “formulário de referência” for the year under review. We had another 
constraint at this stage because not all “formulário de referência” divulged training 
administrators obtained. So we decided to remove the observations (17 observations) that 
do not disclose the information of training to more than 90% of its board members. 
Finally, we eliminate observations in which the residue of statistical regression was more 
than “1.9” (6 observations), then getting a final sample of 102 observations. 




In order to examine whether company disclosure requirements are met with respect to 
business combinations, we developed an index of disclosure, which is used as the 
independent variable of our study. 
There are two types of independent variable in the study: control variables and test 
variables. The control variables selected are: size; leverage; return on assets; operational 
cash flow; industry; listing in the United States, investment fund ownership, independent 
board members, existence of financial or audit committee, goodwill weight and Revenue 
from abroad. The test variables are: foreign board members and training abroad. 
 
4.2.1. Dependent Variable 
 
The dependent variable was examined by analyzing IFRS 3 at the time of the study 
(2010, 2011, 2012 and 2013).  
As our study centers on required disclosure, we focused on paragraphs 59 and 63 of 
IFRS 3. These paragraphs require companies to disclose how business combinations 
occurring in the reporting period, and after the reporting period but before the approval of 
the accounts, affect the financial statements. It also requires companies to disclose whether 
the changes in the period's financial statements are the result of business combinations 
elapsed in the previous annual report period. Paragraphs B64 to B67 of, the IFRS 3 set out 
disclosure requirements. 
It was impossible to confirm compliance with all the information because there are certain 
situations in which non-disclosure does not mean failure to comply but that it is not 
applicable to the company. Then we have built up a table where there was made a selection 
of items that can effectively check. This analysis resulted in a total of 11 major items and 
then according to these items have 13 more sub-items. Note that the organization of main 
items and sub-items is prepared precisely according to the IFRS 3. 
Having constructed Table, we then place the compliance of each item and for each 
company in three classifications: 0 - does not disclose; 0.5 - partially disclosed (e.g., 
disclose only some of the business combinations); and finally 1 - disclose. This led to the 
following index (1): 
Index = [∑ 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=𝑙𝑙 ]/n   (1) 
where Di = item index (0; 0,5 ou 1) and n = number of items. 
This index shows the average level of disclosure of companies. It should be noted that 
constructing the index in this way does not affect businesses that do not disclose because 
it is not required; the average is obtained only from the number of items that should be 
disclosed. Companies with an average close to 1 generally meet the disclosure 
requirements and those with an average close to 0 do not. This index was constructed 
according to similar literature (Patton and Zelenka, 1997, Street and Bryant, 2000, Alanezi 
and Albuloushi, 2011, Cooke, 1989, Naser et al., 2002) 
 
4.2.2. Independent Variables 
 
There are two types of independent variable - the control variables and the variables to 
test the hypotheses. The latter are: foreign board members (FOREIGN BOARD = 
percentage of foreign board members in a company) and training abroad (TRAINING 
ABROAD = percentage of Brazilian board members who have obtained training abroad in 
a company). 
The control variables are: size (SIZE = natural logarithm of total assets); leverage (LEV 
= total liabilities / total assets); return on assets (ROA = net income / total assets); 
operational cash flow (funds from operations / total assets); industry (SIC 4, assigning the 
value "1" if the company belongs to the utility sector) listing in the United States (ADR, 
assigning the value "1" if the firm is listed in the US); investment fund ownership (INVEST 
FUND = percentage of a company owned by an investment fund); independent board 
members (INDEP BOARD = percentage of board members who are independent in a 
company); existence of financial or audit committee (FIN/AUD COMMIT, assigning the 
value "1" if the company has an audit/financial committee; weight of goodwill (GOODWIIL 
= goodwill / total value of the transaction) and finally revenue from abroad (FOREIGN 
REVENUE = percentage of company revenues from abroad). 
These control variables were chosen in line with previous studies. 
The size of firms is often positively associated with both mandatory disclosure 
(Archambault and Archambault, 2003 Ali et al., 2004, Cooke, 1989, Naser et al., 2002). 
However, other authors find no evidence of an association between size and level of 
compliance with IAS required disclosures (Street and Bryant, 2000, Alanezi and Albuloushi, 
2011, Patton and Zelenka, 1997). 
We selected Leverage because some authors argue that firms with greater Leverage are 
likely to disclose more information (Alanezi and Albuloushi, 2011). However, Al-Akra et al. 
(2010) and found mixed results for this variable. And Patton and Zelenka, 1997 not found 
significant results for this variable. 
The link between profitability and mandatory disclosure was also tested by Al-Akra et al. 
(2010) Owusu-Ansah (1998), Alanezi and Albuloushi (2011), Naser et al., (2002). However, 
and for profitability, the results of these studies were not uniform because their relationship 
to compliance has not been proven by Street and Bryant (2000).  
According to the literature, companies with higher liquidity ratios disclosure more 
information (Al-Akra et al., 2010, Naser et al., 2002). However, Al-Akra et al. (2010) found 
mixed results for this variable.  
Prior research has yielded mixed results regarding the association between industry and 
level of disclosure. For example, the next authors found this evidence that type of industry 
is associated with the level of disclosure: Al-Akra et al., 2010 and Alanezi and Albuloushi, 
2011). While, Street and Bryant (2000), Naser et al., (2002) and Patton and Zelenka, (1997) 
found no evidence of an association between industry and extent of compliance with IAS.  
The fact that the companies are listed in the US market has been suggested as a 
determinant of compliance disclosure (Street and Bryant, 2000).  
The ownership of companies by institutional investors can affect the companies' 
disclosure practices (Al-Akra et al., 2010). Because of this fact, we resolve investigate if the 
ownership of investment fund companies affects disclosure. 
The relationship between the independent board members and disclosure already has 
been tested (Verriest et al., 2013, Abdullah et al., 2015, Chen, et al., 2000).  
The audit committee is an important characteristic of internal control because one of its 
responsibilities is monitoring the compliance with the rules like IFRS’s. Empirical research 
provides evidence on the potential contribution on" the audit committee in the financial 
reporting process (Chen, et al., 2000). For example, Al-Akra et al. (2010) and Alanezi and 
Albuloushi, (2011) show a positive relationship between the presence of an audit committee 
and the extent of disclosure.  
The weight of goodwill was also tested when Nakayama (2012) examined the 
relationship between this variable and the fulfillment of disclosure.  
According to the literature, foreign sales increase disclosure (Archambault and 
Archambault, 2003).  
 
4.3. Research Model 
 
This study examines the level of compliance with the IFRS 3 disclosure requirements in 
Brazil as well as the existence of foreign administration and the training received abroad 
may influence this level of compliance. In order to achieve this goal we use the following 
equation model: 
 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆 + 𝛼𝛼2 𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆 + 𝛼𝛼3 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆 + 𝛼𝛼4 𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑆𝑆 + 𝛼𝛼5 𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶 4𝑆𝑆 + 𝛼𝛼6 𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆
+ 𝛼𝛼7 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼 𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆 +  𝛼𝛼8 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝐵𝐵𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆 + 𝛼𝛼9 𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑅𝑅𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼 𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆
+ 𝛼𝛼10 𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆 + 𝛼𝛼11 𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼 𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆 + 𝛼𝛼12 𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼 𝐵𝐵𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆
+ 𝛼𝛼13 𝐼𝐼𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐺𝐺 𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆 + 𝜀𝜀𝑗𝑗   (2) 
 
This equation is Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) that is the most commonly used 
technique in disclosure studies (Cooke, 1989, Naser et al., 2002) where the dependent 
variable is the compliance/disclosure score and the independent variables include the 
factors discussed above. 
Note that this regression has only 3 dichotomous variables: SIC 4, ADR, FIN AUD 
COMMIT. 
 
5. Research findings 
 
5.1. Descriptive Statistics and correlation 
 




The level of compliance with the IFRS 3 disclosure requirements is moderate because 
the average of this variable (INDEX) is 0.65. A minimum of 0.33 meaning that exist 
companies disclose little information. The maximum of 1.00 exists because an observation 
reflects that the company reported all that was supposed to disclose. In other studies, the 
average of this variable is usually higher, for example in Street and Bryant, 2000 and Al-
Akra, et al. 2010 the index of compliance were above 80%.  
The variable SIZE has an average 15.24, which is also close to the results of 
Archambault and Archambault (2003). 
The variable LEV has an average of 0.58 which shows that the sample companies are 
more indebted compared to other studies in which leverage had lower average. (for 
example the study of Al-Akra, et al. 2010 and of Alanezi and Albuloushi (2011) 
We found that the average value of variable ROA is quite low (mean – 0.04), which 
means the companies in question has low profitability. In others similar studies, the 
profitability is higher (Chen, et al. 2000, Al-Akra, et al. 2010, Alanezi and Albuloushi, 2011).  
CASHFLOW variable has an average 0.08 which is consistent with prior research in 
accounting. 
Of the total sample, 14% of companies belong to the utilities industry, 16% are listed in 
the US market and 42% have a financial or audit committee.  
On average companies are held by investment funds at 4.5%, however, there are 
companies that do not have any participation by investment funds, but there are others with 
a great interest because the maximum of this variable is 63%. In study of Al-Akra, et al. 
(2010) a similar variable had a higher average (27%), but in this work the index of 
compliance is also higher.  
Companies have on average 28.7% of its board members as independent ( Chen et 
al., 2000 reached the similar average in their studies). For this variable we find that there 
are companies that do not have independent directors but there are others in which the 
majority are independent, because the maximum is 86%. 
For the variable FIN AUD COMMIT the average is a little low compared to other studies 
(mean: 0,422). For example, in the study of Al-Akra, et al. 2010 the average of the variable 
round the 0,70). However, in study of Alanezi and Albuloushi (2011) the results were similar 
to ours in this variable and in index variable that is the dependent variable. This may mean 
that the enforcement mechanisms are low in the companies analyzed, like in the study of 
Alanezi and Albuloushi (2011) 
For the goodwill we have on average a weight of 63% compared to total value transacted 
which shows that on average goodwill represents more than half of the amount paid in 
business combinations. There are observations that goodwill is 0 because we have a 
badwill. Note also that there are some observations that goodwill is higher than the 
transacted amount (maximum - 4.73%).  
On average 17% of company revenues is obtained from abroad and for this variable we 
found that there are companies that derive all their income in Brazil but there are others in 
which most of the revenues are obtained abroad (maximum - 76.5%). In paper of 
Archambault and Archambault (2003) this variable has a higher average (33%), however it 
was also significant, is not the case in this study (see Table 4).  
Finally, on average 12% of the company's board members are foreigners and for 
Brazilian board members, on average 24% received some kind of training abroad. There 
are companies where the majority of its board members are foreigners (maximum - 91%), 
however, there are others that do not have foreign board members. Companies where the 
board members are mostly foreign are subsidiaries of companies headquartered abroad. 
Note, however that there are companies in the same circumstances in which its board 
members are not mostly foreigners. There are also companies that no board members had 
training abroad but there are others where the majority of the board members received at 
least one type of training abroad. 
 




In table 2 we can find some important correlations. For example, we note that the 
disclosure index is negatively correlated with returns on assets, suggesting that when 
companies have low profitability have also increased efforts to comply with the mandatory 
disclosure in order to inform the scribblings of information. Another fact that is positively 
correlated is the existence of investment funds in the shareholding position of the 
companies analysed, as well as the existence of foreigners in the administration. The 
existence of investment funds positively influence the mandatory disclosure was already 
expected, because when there are investment funds in shareholding position, these are 
more demanding on compliance with disclosure, and with stricter rules. 
With regard to the SIZE variable, we find that there is a positive correlation with the fact 
that the companies are listed in the United States, however a negative correlation with 
foreign board members. These results suggest that the listed companies in the United 
States are the largest, however, larger companies have less foreign in administration. 
In relation to the leverage we verify the existence of a negative correlation with the return 
on assets and operating cash flow. This significant correlation was already expected, 
because the most indebted companies are less profitable and have less operational flows. 
Note also that the return on assets is positively related with the operating cash flow. 
It was also other significant correlations, namely, a positive correlation between listed 
companies in the United States and the weight of goodwill and a negative correlation 
between the existence of a financial/audit committee and revenue from abroad. 
Finally, it can be seen through the table 2 that firms with more foreign board members 
also have more foreign revenue, however, when there are more foreigners, there are also 
fewer Brazilians with some kind of training received abroad in administration. 




Table 3 shows that companies that comply with the mandatory disclosure are companies 
that: are higher; which are less indebted; who have less returns; that have higher operating 
cash flows; who have investment funds in their ownership positions; who have more 
foreigners board members and Brazilian board members with some kind of training abroad. 
Note that the most important variables are the return on assets (ROA), the presence of 
investment funds in shareholding position enterprises (INVEST FUND) and that the foreign 
board members (FOREIGN BOARD), with a significance level of 0.000.  
As it was expected according to the literature (Archambault and Archambault, 2003) the 
variable SIZE shown to have a significant and positive relationship with the compliance 
levels. This variable is very important and there are many explanations for this relationship. 
For example, Abd-Elsalam (1999) argued that firm size is a comprehensive variable that 
could proxy for competitive advantages, information production costs and political costs. 
With regard to the leverage, the regression results are the same as already shown 
literature (Al-Akra, et al. 2010). However, Alanezi and Albuloushi (2011) reached significant 
results for this variable but with opposite sign (positive). 
Regarding profitability, much of the literature has revealed positive and significant 
relationships, for example: Al-Akra, et al. 2010. However, Owusu-Ansah, 1998 found a 
negative significant relationship. This author said that enterprises that lose cash are more 
likely to divulge more information in order to preserve or justify their weak or insufficient 
performance. What happened in our sample is that on average companies have very low 
yields which may explain the negative and significant sign. Alanezi and Albuloushi (2011) 
reached similar results in their study. 
Regarding the results of the liquidity ratio literature presents different results. For 
example, in the study of Al-Akra, et al. (2010), this variable was also significant but had 
negative sign. However, the liquidity ratio of this study was not operational, and our study 
is operational. 
Institutional investors have shown not to be a significant variable in the study of Al-Akra, 
et al. (2010) but in our study it is one of the most important variables. These results were 
expected, because in study of El-Gazzar (1998), the presence of institutional investors in 
companies encourages the dissemination of information because of their fiduciary 
responsibilities and to increase portfolio performance. 
The regression results confirmed the hypothesis of the study. That is, the 
internationalization affects compliance of the disclosure, because FOREIGN BOARD and 
TRAINING ABROAD variables are statistically significant, and the 1st variable (FOREIGN 




This study aims to assess the level of compliance with IFRS 3 disclosure requirements 
and to examine whether certain characteristics of the board members impact such level of 
compliance. The results indicate a moderate level of compliance with the disclosure 
required by IFRS 3 under analysis with an average of 65%. 
We also demonstrate that the level of compliance with IFRS 3 disclosure requirements 
is greater the greater the weight of foreign board managers and the weight of board 
members with training abroad.  
This study contributes to the literature as it confirms that the boars members' 
characteristics may also affect the disclosure performance. This connection had not yet 
been established in previous studies, which only considered variables and underlying 
business characteristics for certain countries. The results of this study are of interest to 
regulators, investment analysts, and market participants. 
The study of other variables that may characterize corporate governance would be a 
fruitful avenue for future research in order to prove that governance also affects the 
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Table 1 – Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean SD Median Min Max 
INDEX 0,652 0,156 0,649 0,333 1,000 
SIZE 15,235 1,827 15,060 8,107 20,989 
LEV 0,582 0,191 0,554 0,181 1,116 
ROA 0,037 0,063 0,033 -0,344 0,241 
CASHFLOW 0,076 0,069 0,073 -0,100 0,307 
SIC 4A 0,137 0,346 0,000 0,000 1,000 
ADRA 0,157 0,366 0,000 0,000 1,000 
INVEST FUND 0,045 0,120 0,000 0,000 0,631 
INDEP BOARD 0,287 0,190 0,250 0,000 0,857 
FIN AUD COMMITA 0,422 0,496 0,000 0,000 1,000 
GOODWILL 0,628 0,708 0,585 0,000 4,722 
FOREIGN REVENUE 0,168 0,265 0,000 0,000 0,991 
FOREIGN BOARD 0,116 0,221 0,000 0,000 0,909 
TRAINING ABROAD 0,237 0,184 0,200 0,000 0,714 
A This average represents the percentage of firms belonging to the utilities industry, listed in the United States, 
















Table 2 - Correlation Matrix 
 











INDEX 1,000              
SIZE 0,069 1,000             
LEV -0,089 0,224** 1,000            
ROA -0,300*** -0,051 -0,474*** 1,000           
CASHFLOW -0,041 -0,001 -0,270*** 0,645*** 1,000          
SIC 4 0,179* 0,193 0,084 -0,074 0,103 1,000         
ADR 0,235** 0,264*** 0,050 -0,016 0,148 0,063 1,000        
INVEST 
FUND 0,482
*** -0,037 -0,177* -0,083 -0,127 0,038 0,326 1,000       
INDEP 
BOARD -0,179
* -0,027 0,098 -0,083 -0,068 -0,001 -0,209** 0,019 1,000      
FIN AUD 
COMMIT 0,151 -0,052 -0,005 0,117 0,216
** 0,121 0,014 0,105 -0,089 1,000     
GOODWILL -0,041 0,125 -0,025 0,176* 0,172* -0,210** 0,263*** -0,114 -0,078 0,035 1,000    
FOREIGN 
REVENUE 0,007 0,028 0,175
* -0,126 -0,048 -0,032 0,070 -0,126 -0,008 -0,274*** -0,003 1,000   
FOREIGN 
BOARD 0,337
*** -0,353*** -0,044 -0,046 -0,003 0,046 -0,106 0,100 -0,166* 0,060 -0,071 0,280*** 1,000  
TRAINING 
ABROAD 0,049 0,153 -0,051 -0,008 0,10 -0,085 0,14 -0,118 0,139 -0,083 0,088 -0,195
** -0,270*** 1,000 
***. Correlation is significant at the 0,01 level (2-tailed). (n = 102). 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0,05 level (2-tailed). (n = 102). 











SIC 4A 0,033 
ADRA 0,055 
INVEST FUND 0,522*** 
INDEP BOARD -0,098 
FIN AUD COMMITA 0,030 
GOODWILL 0,002 
FOREIGN REVENUE -0,006 
FOREIGN BOARD 0,253*** 
TRAINING ABROAD 0,152** 
 
***. Correlation is significant at the 0,01 level (2-tailed). (n = 102). 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0,05 level (2-tailed). (n = 102). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0,1 level (2-tailed). (n = 102). 
 
Adjusted R2: 0,504 
 
 
 
